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The Canadian feature film Hollywood North, like many
American films about the film industry, focuses on Hollywood's
corrupting influence. 1 A Canadian attorney quits practicing law to
produce a movie version of a novel he loves. After incurring a large
debt, he secures the necessary financial backing by signing some
established American stars, one of whom insists on "script approval."
This actor, an aging action star with reactionary political views,
commissions a complete rewrite of the film to match his political
philosophy. Powerless, the lawyer-turned-producer begins shooting
the new script and laments the Faustian bargain he made to produce
his film. Eventually, the author of the novel shows up on the set and
Rick Mortensen is a December 2005 Graduate of Drake Law School and a
former entertainment writer for the Los Angeles Newspaper Group. He currently works as
an associate in the firm of Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen and Jeppson P.C. in Salt Lake
City.
1.
HOLLYWOOD NORTH (Ballpark Productions Ltd. 2003). For examples of
*

American films with a similar focus, see STATE AND MAIN (Fine Line Features 2000) and
SWIMMING WITH SHARKS (Cineville, Inc. 1994).
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sees the mutilated version of her work. She calls the producer names,
but she has no legal recourse. After all, the film only claims to be
"based on" her book.
This interpretation of the term "based on" is consistent with
American case law and entertainment industry practice.2 The action
star's power to mutilate the novelist's work with impunity adds to the
film's pointed critique of Hollywood's degrading influence.
Such
mutilation appears to violate a fundamental legal right. The novelist's
right to keep her creation intact would fall under the heading of
"moral rights," a bundle of artists' rights that is explicitly recognized
3
in other countries but that enjoys only spotty protection in the U.S.
Moral rights are the personal rights - as opposed to economic
rights - artists have in their creations. In most countries that
recognize them, moral rights exist independently of any copyright or
patent protection held in the work. 4 While some countries, most
5
notably France, also recognize the right of disclosure and retraction,
this article concerns itself with the two core moral rights: the right to
get credit for a work of art (attribution) and the right to protect a work
from excessive editing or mutilation (integrity).6 In 1989, the U.S.
adopted the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Work, an international treaty that included a provision
requiring signatories to recognize the rights of attribution and
integrity.7 Congress ratified the treaty without passing any statute
recognizing those rights, reasoning that attribution and integrity were
adequately protected under existing statutes.8 In 1990, Congress
passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), an amendment to the
Copyright Act extending attribution and integrity rights to a narrow

2.
E.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 829-31 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that author was not permitted to enjoin a film's use of the term "based on" because there
was enough similarity between the two works).
3.
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American
MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 97-99 (1985).
4.
See, e.g., id.
5.
See Cheryl Swack, SafeguardingArtistic Creationand the Cultural Heritage:A
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 361, 365-66 (1998).
6.
See Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context,
19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 21 (2001).
7.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September
9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1989).
[T]he author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.

Id.
8.

Hughes, supra note 6, at 20.
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class of visual artwork, 9 but leaving all other forms of art, literature
and music without such protections.
The 2003 Supreme Court decision Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.10 prompted many intellectual property
attorneys to again call on Congress to expand recognition of moral
rights through another amendment to the Copyright Act.I' In Dastar,
the Court stated that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (the federal
trademark and unfair competition statute) does not require those who
legally copy works in the public domain to credit the works' original
authors, at least when the authors are myriad and their contributions
not necessarily copyrightable. 2 Subsequent district and circuit court
decisions applied the case's holding to copyrighted works. 13 The
decision - and especially its definition of "origin of goods" - has
prompted some legal commentators to question whether the U.S. can
even adhere to the Berne Convention without an amendment to the
Copyright Act or a completely new law. 14 Without determining
whether a statutory remedy is likely to come to pass or even advisable,
this article will argue that moral rights in the U.S. still can be
protected through existing remedies.
Part I examines the scope of Dastar and argues that it is
sufficiently narrow to permit some false attribution claims based on
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. As support, Part I examines district
court cases after Dastar as well as pre-Dastar attribution cases that
are still arguably good law. Part II examines the Second Circuit case
of Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., in which the Monty Python comedy troupe
successfully enjoined ABC from showing a mutilated copy of its work,
as a model for pursuing right of integrity claims. 15 Part II will show
that this case is still good law, including its Lanham Act rulings and
16
its explicit endorsement of moral rights
Part III will highlight other avenues artists have to protect
their moral rights, using the bundle of rights given in the Copyright
9.

Visual Rights Act of 1990, § 603(a), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).

10.
539 U.S. 23 (2003).
11.
Stephen T. Lowe & Abhay Khosla, Where Credit Is Due, LOS ANGELES LAW.,
Dec. 27, 2004, at 44, availableat http://www.lacba.org/FilesLALIVo127No9/2096.pdf; see
also Karen Y. Crabbs, The Futureof Authors'and Artists'MoralRights, 26 BEVERLY HILLS
B. ASS'N. J. 167, 174 (1992); Kwall, supra note 3, at 1-97 (demonstrating that attorneys
were calling for statutory recognition).
12.
Dastar,539 U.S. at 24.
13.
Williams v. UMG Recordings, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
14.

See Alexander LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU,

LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,

PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 2:48 (3d ed. 2005); Lowe & Khosla, supra note 11, at 44.
15.
Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976).
16.
See generally id.
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Act. 17 Acknowledging that unequal bargaining power and the realities
of the marketplace often prevent artists from fully exploiting these
rights, this section will suggest collectively bargained agreements as a
way to ensure those rights, using the Writers Guild of America Basic
Agreement as an imperfect, but illustrative, model.
Part IV will examine the effect of VARA on works of art that it
does not protect, using both the text of the statute and the
Congressional record. It will emphasize Congress's intent to keep
VARA separate from the rest of the Copyright Act and refute the
argument that VARA's narrow protections show a Congressional
intent to bar moral rights protection for works outside VARA's scope.
I. DASTAR IS NOT THE DEATH KNELL

The facts of Dastar stretch back more than 50 years to a
memoir General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote detailing his World War
II experiences in Europe.1 8 His publisher, Doubleday, licensed the
book, titled "Crusade in Europe," to Twentieth Century Fox to make a
television series of the same name. 19 Fox hired Time/Life to make the
series, which aired in 1949.20
In 1975, Doubleday renewed its
copyright in the book, but Fox let its copyright in the film lapse. 21 In
1988, Fox re-acquired the television rights to the book and gave New
Line Home Video and SFM Entertainment the exclusive rights to
distribute videos of the 1949 television series. 22 Meanwhile Dastar,
recognizing that the series was now in the public domain, used it to
make a video of its own. 23 Although Dastar's video made only minor
modifications to the original series, it gave no credit to Fox or anyone
else involved in making the original series. 24 Fox, New Line and SFM
brought an action alleging that Dastar violated Doubleday's copyright
25
in the book, and thus, their exclusive television rights in the film.
They later amended their complaint to also allege that Dastar's sale of
the tapes "without proper credit" was an example of "reverse palming
off' and violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.26 Before the case

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 25 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.

24.

Id. at 27.

25.
26.

Id.
Id.
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got to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit remanded the copyright
claim for further factual determinations - specifically, whether
Eisenhower's agreement with Doubleday was a valid "work for hire"
agreement. 27 The Supreme Court decided only the Lanham Act
28
issue.
The Supreme Court dismissed the claim in a unanimous
decision with one abstention. 29 In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia
framed the plaintiffs' Lanham Act claim as an attempt to resurrect an
expired copyright. 30 In his recitation of the facts, he noted that Fox
added the Lanham Act claim as an amendment to Doubleday's
copyright claim, 31 and his analysis showed a determination to prevent
32
the Lanham Act from pre-empting the Copyright Act's limitations.
He reached his objective through a careful parsing of the statutory
33
language in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The Lanham Act provides civil redress to claimants damaged
by certain types of statements or representations made in commerce.
The Act includes the federal trademark statute as well as other
provisions protecting unregistered marks. 34 Section 43(a)(1) of the Act
is divided into two parts: section 43(a)(1)(A) lists several types of
actionable commercial communications, 3 5 and section 43(a)(1)(B) is
specifically concerned with false advertising. 36 Section 43(a)(1)(A), the
basis of the Dastar claims, also has two parts: a list of eight types of
commercial communication and a list of six ways those
communications could confuse or deceive consumers. 3 7 The Dastar
plaintiffs based their claim on one item from each list: "false
designation of origin" from list one and "origin" from list two. They
alleged that Dastar's failure to credit Fox as the origin of the video
constituted a false designation of the origin of goods likely to deceive
or confuse consumers as to the video's origin.38 The Court determined
that the claim hinged on the meaning of the words "origin" and
"goods."39

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 26, n.2; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (defining "work for hire").
Dastar,539 U.S. at 28.
Id. at 23 (Breyer, J., recusing himself).
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 31-32.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
Dastar,539 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 31.
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Relying on precedent, 40 the dictionary, 4 1 the history of both the
Lanham and Copyright Acts, 42 and practical concerns, 43 the Court
ruled that "goods" were the tangible videotapes and "origin" was the
producer of those tangible goods. 44 The Court reasoned that "origin"
could include the company that commissioned or approved the
production of the videotapes, but not the creators of the content of the
tapes, pointing out that the creators of intellectual content are
protected by copyright and patent. 45 Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim
would be valid only if the defendant purchased the actual videotapes,
and repackaged them as its own before selling them. 46 Even though
Dastar's modifications to the video were minor, the fact that it copied
and edited the footage on new videotapes was enough for Dastar to be
47
deemed the "origin" of the goods under section 43(a).
At first glance, such a narrow definition of "origin" appears to
disenfranchise those who create the content for videos and other
commercial media. However, as Justice Scalia points out, such
creators still have protections under the Copyright Act, 48 which,
49
unlike the Lanham Act, was created to reward creative artists.
Moreover, the Court did not completely close the Lanham Act to
attribution claims; it only closed a small section of 43(a)(1)(A) - the
parts involving the word "origin" - to attribution claims for public
domain works. 50 In its opinion, the Court cites both practical concerns
and precedent that demonstrate why section 43(a)(1)(A) is ill-suited
for attribution for such claims. 51
One of the practical reasons the Dastar opinion gave not to
extend the definition of "origin" to the creators of intellectual property
is the challenge of determining the true creator of a television series
like "Crusade in Europe. '52 The origin of the content could be traced
beyond Fox, who merely commissioned it, and Time, who merely
pieced together battlefield footage, newsreels and parts of
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 31.
42.
Id. at 28-30.
43.
Id. at 35-38.
44.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 32-34, 37-38
45.
46.
Id. at 31.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 37-38.
49.
Id. at 33-34; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (encouraging creation by
granting Congress the power to provide creators with limited monopolies over their works).
50.
Dastar,539 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 35-37.
51.
52.
Id. at 35-36.
40.

41.
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Eisenhower's book. 53 The Court opined that, more than the plaintiffs,
the originators of the content in question were "the United States
Army, Navy, and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of Information
and War Office, the National Film Board of Canada, and unidentified
'Newsreel Pool Cameramen.' "54
Without a valid copyright as a
backdrop, it is difficult to determine whom to credit. 55 As the opinion
noted, "[w]e do not think the Lanham Act requires this search for the
56
source of the Nile and all its tributaries."
As Scalia noted, an extension of the definition of "origin" could
also conflict with precedent in other types of Lanham Act cases. The
wrong alleged in Dastarwas "reverse palming off," which occurs when
a producer misrepresents someone else's goods or services as her
own. 5 7 A definition of "origin" that included the creator of the
intellectual property behind goods in commerce would conflict with
precedent in claims for simple "palming off' (representing one's own
goods or services as those of someone else). 58 Claims for palming off
often occur when a "knock-off' brand is likely to be mistaken for a
reputable name brand, thus cutting into the name brand's sales,
trading on its good will, and, if the knock-off goods are of shoddy
quality, tarnishing its reputation. 59 In order to bring such a claim
when no explicit claim of origin is made, precedent requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate that its goods have acquired secondary meaning,
or in other words, are recognizable by consumers as belonging to its
brand.6 0 If the definition of origin of goods included such intellectual
property as the design of its product - which would normally be
protected by patent or copyright - the plaintiff could skirt the
requirement for secondary meaning and simply bring a claim for
61
reverse palming off.
As the opinion pointed out, an expanded definition of "origin"
could give rise to more absurd results. If a plaintiffs design were
already in the public domain, it could still claim, as Fox did, that the
knock-off used its design without giving it proper credit. 62 Ironically, if
the producer of the knock-off brand did give the name brand proper
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(2000)).
61.
62.

See id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 28 n.1.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 36 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 208
Dastar,539 U.S. at 36-37.
See id. at 36.
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credit, then the name brand could have a reverse palming off claim
under section 43(a)(1)(A) because the labeling could cause confusion as
63
to "affiliation" or "approval."
Considering Dastar's reputation as hostile to artist's' rights, it
is worth noting that all four of its unsuccessful plaintiffs were
corporations, none of which claimed to make any artistic contribution
to the intellectual property in question. 64 Indeed, the only identifiable
"artist" in the case was the late General Eisenhower, who arguably
relinquished the copyright and control of the work to his publisher,
Doubleday. 65 The court's unanimity may be linked to plaintiffs'
seemingly disingenuous position: they were not creators seeking credit
66
but corporate licensees who had let their copyright protection lapse.
As holders of what they thought were the exclusive rights to distribute
the video in question, the plaintiffs wanted to stop the defendant from
selling its version of the video, and it is doubtful that their aim would
have changed had the defendant given them "proper credit. 6 7
Even under the Court's definition of "origin," creative artists
seeking proper credit may still use section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a
fact which has eluded some commentators. 68 As noted above, Dastar
concerned the term "origin" only as used in section 43(a)(1)(A) of the
Lanham Act. 69 "False designation of origin" is only one of at least
three types of communications the subsection lists, and "origin" is only
Thus, even without using
one of several means of deception. 70
"origin," there are several ways a defendant could be liable under
section 43(a)(1)(A). 7 1 Artists can still argue that improper attribution
is likely to confuse or deceive as to "connection," "association,"
"sponsorship" or "approval," 72 which would include most claims for
73
simple "palming off."

63.
64.
65.
a work for

Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)

(2000)).

Id. at 23.
The Ninth circuit held that whether or not Eisenhower intended the book to be
hire was a triable issue of fact and remanded it to the district court. Id. at 24

n.2.

66.
67.
which they
68.
40.
69.

70.
71.

See id. at 26.
Id. at 27 (discussing the plaintiffs claim under section 43 of the Lanham Act in
allege that Dastar's sales "without proper credit" constitute reverse passing off).
See LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 14, § 2:43; Lowe & Khosla, supra note 11, at
Dastar,539 U.S. at 31.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000).
Dastar,539 U.S. at 31-33.

72.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).

73.

Dastar,539 U.S. at 28-31.
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As the Dastar opinion noted, section 43(a)(1)(B)'s provision for
false advertising claims, which does not even contain the word
"origin," is also a valid cause of action for artists seeking redress for
certain types of false attribution. 74 Until the 1988 Trademark
Revision Act, "false designation of origin" and "any false description or
representation" appeared side by side in the same provision listing
actionable commercial communication. 75 As noted above, the current
version of section 43(a) relegates false advertising claims to section
43(a)(1)(B), which requires that they be "in commercial advertising or
promotion" and misrepresent "the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities." 76 While the statute appears to set the bar
higher for false advertising claims, certain types of false attribution
cases can clear it. For example, a published book or album, which
falsely purports to be the work of a famous artist misrepresents its
"nature, characteristics or qualities" in "commercial advertising,"
77
thereby providing a valid section 43(a)(1)(B) claim.
District court cases in Dastar's progeny have recognized the
distinction between claims arising under section 43(a)(1)(A) and those
arising under section 43(a)(1)(B). 78 Many of these cases fall outside
the entertainment and publishing industries, 79 but their holdings
remain applicable to those industries. Decided a year after Dastarin
the district of Kansas, Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design
Consultants dismissed a section 43(a)(1)(A) reverse palming off claim,
while leaving open a section 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising claim to
determine whether the same facts cleared the "commercial advertising
In making its section 43(a)(1)(A)
or promotion" hurdle.8 0
determination, the Larkin court surveyed and synthesized Dastar's
81
first-year progeny.
The plaintiff in Larkin was an aquatic design firm suing a
The
competing firm formed by two of its former employees.8 2
stole
the
employees,
former
the
defendants,
complaint alleged that
Id. at 38.
74.
75.
Id. at 31 n.3 (quoting the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 76 Pub. L. No. 489,
60 Stat. 441 (1946)).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
76.
77.
See generally Follet v. New Am. Library Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
78.
See, e.g., Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc., 323 F. Supp.
2d 1121 (D.Kan.2004).
See, e.g., id.
79.
80.
Id. at 1127-29.
81.
Id. at 1125-27.
82.
Id. at 1123.
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plaintiffs designs and used them in proposals to three potential
clients, which were also the plaintiffs potential clients.8 3 The court
found that Dastarforeclosed the section 43(a)(1)(A) claim, because the
proposals were not goods in commerce and even if they were, the
defendants did not misrepresent their "origin" according to Dastar's
definition of the term (defendants were the origin of the tangible
proposals, regardless of who originated each part).8 4 None of the nonorigin prongs of section 43(a)(1)(A) - "connection". "approval" etc. applied in this case, as they generally apply to cases of palming off
rather than reverse palming off.8 5
In determining whether the defendants' actions fit under
section 43(a)(1)(B) as "commercial advertising or promotion" the court
applied the industry-specific Tenth Circuit definition, which asks if
the information is "disseminated sufficiently to the relevant
purchasing public to constitute 'advertising' or 'promotion' within that
industry."8 6 Noting that, in some industries, communication with one
potential purchaser could be a sufficient portion of the relevant
purchasing public,8 7 the court found it needed more facts to determine
whether sending proposals to three potential clients was sufficient to
constitute "commercial advertising or promotion" in the aquatic
facility design industry.8 8 Apparently, this court left the second
section 43(a)(1)(B) hurdle - whether the proposals misrepresented the
"nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin" of either
plaintiffs or defendant's services - for further factual determinations
89
as well.
The Southern District of Iowa case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Intl. v.
Syngenta Seeds Inc. clarified that section 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising
claims must clear this second hurdle. 90
The plaintiff, a seed
manufacturer and breeder, alleged that its competitor used its
83.
Id. at 1123.
84.
Id. at 1126-27; see, e.g., Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp.
2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that the use of a table leg, made by another manufacturer,
in a display model for a table did not violate section 43(a)(1)(A) after Dastar), affd, 419
F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2005).
85.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000) (noting that the "non-origin" terms have to
do with misrepresenting a product's connection or affiliation with a person or company,
which comes into play when a manufacturer tries to pass off her own goods as the goods of
someone else).
86.
Larkin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222
F.3d 1262, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 2000)).
87.
Id. at 1128 (citing Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173
F.3d 725, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1999)).
88.
Id.
89.
See id.
90.
No. 4:02-cv-90541 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 17, 2004).
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germplasm - the genetic information from which seed corn is derived 91
- to make seed corn it then packaged as its own, giving the impression
it had come from defendant's germplasm. 92 Acknowledging that
Dastar made section 43(a)(1)(A) unavailable, the plaintiff contended
that marketing seeds made from its germplasm as defendant's own essentially, reverse palming off - was false advertising under section
43(a)(1)(B). 93 The court dismissed the claim, finding that marketing
seed corn without crediting the true developer of the germplasm did
not misrepresent the product's "nature, qualities, characteristics or
geographic origin." 94 The opinion stated that plaintiff would need to
show more evidence of such misrepresentation to proceed on section
43(a)(1)(B), but it did not in any way suggest that the subsection was
95
off-limits in attribution cases.
In spite of Dastar's clear language and the holdings of its
progeny, some commentators still mischaracterize the case as the end
of section 43(a) claims for attribution. 96 Alexander Lindey and Michael
Landau do just that in the third edition of their treatise, Lindey on
EntertainmentPublishingand the Arts.97 Not only does their treatise
omit any mention of the "non-origin" attribution claims available in
section 43(a)(1)(A), but it fails to note the 1988 revision of the Lanham
Act, which brought about the existence of section 43(a)(1)(B). As
argued below, this new provision saves many of the pro-attribution
cases they claim Dastaroverturned. Moreover, the difference between
"palming off' and "reverse palming off' appears to elude them, which
also leads them to overstate Dastar's effect. 98 They cite several
earlier, pro-attribution decisions to support their assertion that
Dastar effectively overturned "decades of common practice." 99
However, all but one of the Lanham Act cases they cite are still
arguably good law. An examination of a few of them is illustrative of
the continued utility of section 43(a) in cases of improper attribution.
In the fascinating case of Follet v. New American Library, Inc.,
best-selling author Ken Follet successfully sued to change the
placement of his name on a non-fiction book he had edited. 10 0 Before

91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1 n.1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.

94.

Id. at 6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000)).

95.

See generally id.

96.

See LINDEY & LANDAU, supranote 14, § 2:48.

97.
98.
99.
100.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Follet v. New American Library Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (D.C.N.Y. 1980).
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he gained fame as a novelist, Follet did editing work for New
American, including a rewrite of a non-fiction book by a French
author.101 Hoping to cash in on the success of Follet's novels, New
American released the French author's book with Follet's name on the
cover in large print, implying Follet was the principle author. 10 2 The
cover further perpetuated this illusion, stating the book was "by the
author of' and listing two of Follet's novels. 10 3 The non-fiction book
was released at the same time Follet was promoting his newest novel,
and conceivably diluted some of its commercial impact.1 0 4 Addressing
the cause of action, the District Court cited the old version of section
43(a), which places all types of actionable communication in the same
subsection. 10 5 It then analyzed Follet's contribution to the non-fiction
book and determined what was meant by "principle author." 10 6 The
court determined that such a cover display was false, and thus
violated the Lanham Act. 10 7 The court found the book "constitute[d] a
false representation and false designation of origin,"10 8 but the court's
subsequent reasoning indicates that a false description would be
sufficient to find for the plaintiff. 109 The claim, if it arose today, would
likely be valid under section 43(a)(1)(B) of the modern Lanham act, 110
and would be unaffected by the Dastar ruling. To fans of Follet's
fiction work, such a false designation of authorship misrepresents the
"characteristics or qualities" of the non-fiction book, inducing potential
buyers to believe it contains the characteristics and qualities of
Follet's fiction.'
The same holds for the Southern District of New York case of
Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp.11 2 and the Second Circuit
case of PPX Enterprises,Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enterprises,Inc.113 Both
cases involved early recordings of famous guitarists, George Benson
and Jimmy Hendrix respectively, which featured them as background

101.
Id. at 306.
102.
Id. at 308.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
See id. at 310-11.
106.
Id. at 311.
107.
Id. at 312.
108.
Id. at 309.
109.
See id. at 312.
110.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
111.
See Follet, 497 F. Supp. at 312 (noting the court's rationale for the finding that
Follet's rewrites, however extensive, did not make him the principle author of the work in
question).
112.
452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
113.
818 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1987).
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session players.1 14 In both cases, the courts found that the sellers of
these recordings violated the Lanham Act with misleading packaging
likely to cause consumers to believe the artists mentioned were
featured performers.1 1 5 Both courts based their decisions on the false
description rather than false designation of origin clause of the old
statute; PPX explicitly stated that this was not a "false designation of
origin" case, and both opinions held that the false descriptions on the
album covers misrepresented the characteristics of the products
inside.1 1 6 This put both rulings squarely inside section 43(a)(1)(B)
protection and outside Dastar'ssphere of influence.
The only holding mentioned in the Lindey and Landau treatise
that Dastar affects is the 1980 Ninth Circuit ruling in Smith v.
Montoro.11 7 The case involved a film studio that had removed an
actor's name from the credits and promotional materials of a film in
which he appeared, substituting another actor's name.1 1 8 The Ninth
Circuit overturned the dismissal of the actor's section 43(a) claim,
stating that such a substitution constituted a valid claim of "express
reverse palming off."11 9 Smith was cited in the 2003 case Williams v.
UMG Recordings, Inc.,1 20 a case that, like Dastar, involved a copyright
claim for the illegal use of copyrighted material and a section 43(a)
claim for the use of that material without proper credit. 121 The
Central District of California denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim a few months before
Dastar,and then reversed itself immediately after Dastar.122 It found
the Supreme Court's definition of "origin" overruled previous Ninth
Circuit decisions "to the extent they find a reverse passing off claim
based on the failure to credit the author of any idea, concept or
communication embodied by the tangible goods." 123 The lower court
also found that the Supreme Court's ruling barred such reverse
passing off claims whether or not the object of misattribution was
124
under copyright.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See PPX Enters., 818 F.2d at 267; Benson, 452 F. Supp. at 517.
See PPX Enters., 818 F.2d at 272; Benson, 452 F. Supp. at 518.
See PPX Enters., 818 F.2d at 272; Benson, 452 F. Supp. at 518.
648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 607.
281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D.Cal. 2003).
See id. at 1179.
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1184 n.10.
Id. at 1185.
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Even under the Central District's interpretation, plaintiffs in a
situation identical to the one in Smith may bring an action based on
section 43(a)(1)(B). Listing the wrong name in a film's promotional
materials could be found to misrepresent the "nature, characteristics,
[or] qualities" of the film,

125

depending on the level of fame of the

named or unnamed actor and his/her ability to affect consumer
perception of the film. Like in the PPXEnterprises,Benson and Follet
cases, the defendant's conduct in Smith could be actionable without
126
involving the "origin" clauses.
While Dastarwas not as fatal to attribution claims as Lindey
and Landau suggest, it did overturn at least one landmark attribution
case that was favorable to creators. The Ninth Circuit case of Lamothe
v. Atlantic Recording Corp. allowed co-authors of joint works to sue for
credit, relying on a definition of "origin" that included authorship. 127
The case involved two songs recorded by the popular heavy metal
group Ratt. 128 Robinson Crosby, a member of Ratt, had written the
songs with Robert Lamothe and Ronald Jones, who were members of
his former band, Mac Meda. 129 The Copyright Act allows one author of
a joint work to license the work without the consent of the other
authors, as long as the license is non-exclusive and the other authors
receive their share of the profits. 30 Crosby licensed the songs to a
publisher, which licensed them to Atlantic Records, which sublicensed them to the sheet music company Chappell Music. 13

The

credits on the sheet music and album cover failed to list Lamothe and
Jones as co-authors of either of the songs, so Jones and Lamothe sued
under the old version of section 43(a).1 32 In denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit cited Smith
heavily, 133 noting that in claims for reverse palming off: "the originator
of the misidentified product is involuntarily deprived of the
advertising value of [his] name and the goodwill that otherwise would
stem from public knowledge of the true source of the satisfactory

125.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).

126.

See J.

THOMAS

MCCARTHY,

MCCARTHY

ON

TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR

COMPETITION § 10:28 n.3 (4th ed. 2003).
127.
847 F.2d. 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988).
128.
Id. at 1405.
129.
Id.
130.
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F. 3d. 195, 199 (2d. Cir. 1998) (citing 17 U.S.C. §
201(a)); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir.

1988).
131.
132.
133.

Lamothe, 847 F.2d at 1405.
Id.
Id. at 1405-07.
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product."'134 Because it found a reverse palming off claim in a case of
misattribution, and had no alternative theory, this case was clearly
overturned by Dastar.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged a public policy reason to
extend the Lanham Act to claims fcr attribution. 135 In Lamothe, the
forgotten co-authors had no copyright claim. 136 Unlike the claims in
PPX Enterprises, Benson and possibly Smith, their claim does not rise
to the level of section 43(a)(1)(B), because leaving out relatively
unknown authors does not misrepresent the "nature, characteristics,
[or] qualities" of the work.' 37 Nor would it qualify under the nonorigin parts of section 43(a)(1)(A), because no "association,"
"sponsorship," or "approval' 38 is alleged.
Even though the Copyright Act entitles the co-authors like
those in Lamothe to a share of the revenues, credit is often a more
valuable commodity to songwriters and other "behind the scenes"
artists seeking to build a career. 139 It could have been worse for them;
if they'd written the songs under the Copyright Act's "work for hire"
40 It
provision, they would be entitled to no share of the profits at all.
is the relatively unknown artist, working behind the scenes on a
project whose destiny she does not legally control, who is the most
hurt by Dastar,and presents the strongest case for an amendment to
the Copyright Act. However, artists in this class can protect their
right to attribution in other ways.
II. GILLIAM IS GOOD LAW
As shown by the cases above, an artist wishing to remove her
name from a work' 4 ' has a better chance of success under Dastar's
construction of section 43(a) than an artist wishing to add her name to
a work. 142 In Follet, Benson, and PPX Enterprises,established artists

134.
135.

Id. at 1407.
Id.

136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1405.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).

139.
Lowe & Khosla, supra note 11, at 41; Robert L. Gordon, Giving the Devil Its
Due: Actors' and Performers' Right to Receive Attribution for Cinematic Roles, 4 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 299 (1985); see also Smith v. Montoro, 648 F. 2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).
140.
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
141.
See PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1987);
Follet v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Benson v. Paul Winley
Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)..
142.
See Lamothe v. Atl. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988);
Smith, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
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sought to protect their reputations by removing their names from
works that falsely represented their talents or creative voice.1 4 3 Their
motive is similar to that of an artist who wants to assert the moral
right of integrity and protect her work from mutilation or excessive
editing.
In situations where an artist feels her work has been
mutilated, she may seek to completely enjoin it from publication or
broadcast. 144 This is especially true when dissociation from the work
is impossible or would do little to alleviate the damage. 145 Seeking
injunction may be a way to force the publishing entity to scale back its
changes,1 46 or it may be an earnest attempt to keep the mutilated
work out of the public sphere.
In Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., the creators of several episodes of
"Monty Python's Flying Circus" were granted a preliminary injunction
to keep an edited version of their work from airing in the U.S.147 The
creators, who also appeared in the sketches, did not contract directly
with the defendant network, but had granted the BBC, which
originally aired the episodes in the U.K, the right to license broadcasts
"inany overseas territory."' 48 From the BBC, Time-Life acquired the
right to distribute the tapes in the U.S. and it was Time-Life who
contracted with ABC and edited the episodes at ABC's request. 149
The plaintiffs' action against ABC involved a copyright claim
and a Lanham Act claim under the old version of section 43(a).1 50 The
copyright claim hinged on the construction of the plaintiffs' original
contract with the BBC. 1 5' Termed a "scriptwriters' agreement," the
contract provided for the plaintiffs to write and deliver the scripts to
the BBC.1 52 The agreement required the network to consult with the
writers about any changes they intended to make to the script and did
15 3
not provide for any changes or cuts after the scripts were recorded.
As an additional safeguard, the writers retained for themselves all

143.

See generally, PPX Enters., 818 F.2d 266; Follet, 497 F. Supp. 304; Benson, 452

F. Supp. 516..
144.
Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
145.
See id. (recognizing that the creators of the sketches were also the performers,
so it would be impossible to show the mutilated sketches without involving their
identities).
146.
See id. at 18 (noting that the creators of the comedy sketch attempted to
negotiate with the mutilators before seeking an injunction).
147.
Id. at 26.
148.
Id. at 17.
149.
Id. at 17-18.
150.
Id. at 19-20, 24-25.
151.
See id. at 19-21.
152.
See id. at 17 n.2 (providing the agreement terms).
153.
See id.
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rights not specifically granted in the contract.1 54 Along with the
overseas distribution rights, the BBC gave Time-Life permission to
edit the tapes "for insertion of commercials, applicable censorship or
governmental . . . rules and regulations, and National Association of
Broadcasters and time segment requirements."' 15 5 As part of its
finding that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits,
the Second Circuit found that such rights to edit were not the BBC's to
give, and therefore, the mutilations violated the writer's copyright in
the work. 156
The court's rationale illustrates the potential of the Copyright
Act for pursuing mutilation claims. Gilliam came down before the
Act's 1976 revision, but the Gilliam court based its decision on the
"derivative works" provisions in the Copyright Act,1 57 which, along
with the court's interpretation of those provisions, remain good law.
Moreover, the 1976 Act's elimination of the distinction between
common law and statutory copyright, and the accompanying
requirement that a work must first be published before it is
protected,15 8 strengthens the plaintiffs position.
In explaining the rationale for its decision on the copyright
claim, the Gilliam court stated, "the ability of the copyright holder to
control his work remains paramount in our copyright law." 15 9 After
rebutting what it described as "technical" arguments from the
defendant, the court stated that the purpose of the copyright act was
"to recognize the important role of the artist in our society and the
need to encourage production and dissemination of artistic works by
providing adequate legal protection."1 60 In using the Copyright Act to
protect the plaintiffs' work from mutilation, the Second Circuit
connected the right of integrity to the primary constitutional purpose
of the copyright act, which is to encourage artists to create. 16 1
As for finding likelihood of success on the section 43(a) claim,
the court issued a more explicit endorsement of moral rights, which it
described as including "the right of the artist to have his work
attributed to him in the form in which he created it."162 The opinion

154.
155.
156.
157.
see also 17
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19 (citing the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909));
U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 19-20 n.3.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
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stated that, while not explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act, the
rights of attribution and integrity are essential to the economic rights
the Act protects, and thus, must be protected by means "outside the
statutory law of copyright.' 163 The court continued, "[a]lthough such
decisions are clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation,
they also properly vindicate the author's personal right to prevent the
presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form."'164 The

court found that ABC's cuts "impaired the integrity" of plaintiffs work
5
and presented to the public "a mere caricature of their talents.' 16
Like many of the above-mentioned cases, Gilliam involved the
old version of section 43(a), which does not draw a clear line between
false advertising and false designations of origin. 166 However, the
court in Gilliam, like the Ninth Circuit in Lamothe,167 appears to rely

more on the false designation of origin clause, 168 which puts it in
potential conflict with Dastar.169 As with the cases mentioned above,
this conflict can be reconciled by placing the case within section
43(a)(1)(B) or in the non-origin provisions of section 43(a)(1)(A).
First, to fit into the section 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising prong,
the conduct must be "in commercial advertising or promotion" and
"misrepresent[] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin" of a product, service, or enterprise. 170 The first hurdle is to
classify the episodes in question as "commercial advertising or
promotion."'' 1
The Gilliam court implied this classification was
appropriate by mentioning that the ABC broadcast would be many
Americans' first impression of the Monty Python comedy troupe, and
would thus determine whether or not they would become fans.172 The
opinion also found that the mutilation of the episodes would
misrepresent the qualities of the troupe to such viewers, 173 thus
satisfying the other element of section 43(a)(1)(B).
In the alternative, Gilliam and other mutilation cases can be
reconciled with Dastarby placing them within section 43(a)(1)(A), but
outside the reach of Dastar'sdefinition of origin. In a mutilation case
163.
164.

Id.
Id.

165.

Id. at 25.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 § 43(a), 76 Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 441 (1946).
Lamothe v. Atl. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1988).
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003).
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(B) (2000).

171.

Id.

172.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 19.
173.
Id.; see also id. at 24 (noting that it exposed plaintiffs to criticism for work that
was not theirs).
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like Gilliam a "word, term, name, symbol or device or any combination
thereof' might be likely to confuse or deceive as to "approval of his or
her goods, services or commercial activities by another person.' 174 By
broadcasting the mutilated versions of Monty Python sketches, ABC
arguably presented a "combination" of "words," "names" and "devices"
likely to lead viewers to the false belief that the creators approved of
such mutilations. 175 Essentially, ABC was "palming off' the edited
176
product as the work (fitting under "service" or "commercial activity" )
of the plaintiff. 177 This false belief is made more plausible because the
178
creators were also the actors shown on the screen.
Therefore, a mutilation case with facts similar to Gilliam could
still be brought under section 43(a)(1)(B) or under the "palming off'
provisions of section 43(a)(1)(A), even though Gilliam itself was
brought under a more liberal definition of "origin."
III. OTHER AVENUES TO ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY
Gilliam is a particularly useful model for integrity claims, as
well as a resource for attribution claims, because it found likelihood of
success on all three main avenues for pursuing moral rights:
copyright, unfair competition (which includes the Lanham Act) and
contract. 179 It also showed how copyright and contract claims can be
used in concert: the court found that Time-Life violated the plaintiffs'
copyright because its editing exceeded the rights plaintiffs granted to
the BBC in their "writer's agreement."' 8 0 When used in conjunction
with a contract, the rights protected in the Copyright Act' 8 1 are
powerful tools in the protection of moral rights.
A. Using the CopyrightAct's "Bundle"of Rights
The Gilliam court's finding that the right of integrity, termed
the right to "control" by the court, is a necessary part of the Copyright
82
Act's protections is supported by specific provisions in the statute.
Although the Copyright Act is generally viewed as a protection for
174.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
175.
Id.; Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
176.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
177.
See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003)
(distinguishing "reverse passing off' from "palming off').
178.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 17.
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 17, 20, 24.
179.
180.
Id. at 22.
181.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
See id.
182.
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economic rights, the provisions involving "derivative works,"18 4 and
their interplay with the compulsory license provision for sound
recordings,18 5 show a concern that goes beyond the pecuniary.
As one of the six exclusive rights a copyright holder may "do or
authorize," section 106 grants the right "to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work."'1 6 Section 101 defines a derivative
work, listing several examples: "translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.' 8 7
Unless the creation meets the qualifications to be a "work made for
hire,"' 88 the copyright belongs to the creator upon creation, 8 9 and she
has the right to authorize any of the above derivative works and
dictate the terms of that authorization. 190 Essentially, she can ensure
her rights of attribution and integrity as a term of such authorization.
Even the fictional novelist in Hollywood North could have insisted on
script approval and credit as terms of her authorization to make a film
91
version of her book.
Seemingly more problematic from a moral rights perspective is
the compulsory license for sound recordings found in section 115192 but even that provision is tempered by a concern for moral rights.
After the copyright holder has made or authorized a sound recording
of a "non-dramatic"'' 93 musical work and distributed copies of it to the
public, section 115 allows any other artist to record and release a
"cover" version, as long as she notifies and pays a statutory royalty to
the copyright holder.' 94 This provision clearly scales back the right to

184.
See id. § 106(2).
185.
See id. § 115.
186.
See id. § 106(2).
187.
See id. § 101.
188.
See id. § 101 (defining "work made for hire"); id. § 201(b) (defining ownership
rights for a "work made for hire").
189.
See id. § 201(a).
190.
See id. § 106.
191.
See, e.g., HOLLYWOOD NORTH (Ballpark Productions, Ltd. 2003).
192.

17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).

193.

"Non-dramatic" includes all musical works excluding complete musical plays

and operas. See generally Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50 (finding that a
performance of 20 of the 23 songs from Jesus Christ Superstar,in their original sequence,
was a "dramatic performance" and as such was not subject to compulsory license
provisions).
194.
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)-(c); see also id. §§ 801(b)(1), 803 (authorizing the Librarian of
Congress to appoint and convene copyright arbitration panels to readjust the rate listed in
§ 115); 63 Fed. Reg. 7,288, 7,289 (Feb. 13 1998) (Section 255.30) sets the royalty rate at 8.5
cents a copy or 1.65 sense a minute for records made and distributed after January 1 2004.
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prepare or authorize derivative works; without it, section 106(2) would
give composers (and those to whom they sell their copyrights) the
right to control all recordings of their work as derivative works. 195 In
order to prevent mutilation pursuant to a compulsory license, section
115(a)(2) limits the amount a compulsory licensee can change the
original work, prohibiting alterations to "the basic melody or
fundamental character .. . ."196 It also denies compulsory licensees the
copyright protections afforded to authorized makers of derivative
works, putting cover recordings outside the definition of derivative
works. 197 The message to compulsory licensees is clear: you may copy
with only notification and payment, but you must have authorization
1 98
to change the melody or character of the piece.
In addition to the right to prepare derivative works, section 106
gives creators the exclusive right to make copies of the work,
distribute copies to the public, perform or display the work publicly
and, in the case of recordings, transmit the work to the public in a
digital audio format' 99 such as radio. 20 0 The section also gives creators
the ability to license their right to producers, record labels or film
studios, which, in theory, means they can insist on proper attribution
and complete integrity as a condition of the license. 2 0' In practice,
however, the alienability of these rights and the unequal bargaining
power of many emerging artists means that the rights of attribution
and integrity are often the first things sacrificed in order to get a work
20 2
disseminated to the public.
In some cases, particularly in the music industry, asserting and
monitoring all of one's section 106 rights is impractical. For example,
it is impossible for the writer of a hit song to personally collect her fee
every time her song is played on a radio station or performed by a
cover band in a bar. That task falls to one of three performing rights
societies 20 3 - ASCAP, BMI or SESAC - which collect subscription fees
Section 255.3(m) states that it will go up to 9.1 cents a copy or 1.75 cents a minute in

2006.).
195.

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (listing sound recordings

as an example of a derivative

work); id. § 106(2) (vesting an exclusive right to authorize derivative works in the creator).
196.
Id. § 115(a)2.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.; see id. § 101 (defining "derivative work" to include "any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed or adapted"); id. § 106(2).
199.
Id. § 106(1)-(6).
200.
Id. § 101 (providing a general description of "digital transmission[s]").
201.
See id.
202.
However, this trend appears to be changing with the proliferation of artistowned record labels, such as Kung Fu, Nitro, Hopeless, Epitaph, and Fat Wreck Chords,
and director owned film production companies.
203.
Id. § 101 (defining "performing rights societies").
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from radio stations and performance venues, monitors the ubiquity of
the song and pays the artist an estimated share based on the going
royalty. Similarly, the task of granting licenses to record cover
versions often falls to the Harry Fox Agency which allows the licensee
to avoid the stringent reporting requirements of the compulsory
license. 20 4 When these section 106 authorizations are farmed out, it is
difficult for creators to insist on any special rights to integrity and
attribution.
B. Using Collective Bargainingto Protect the Rights of Attribution and
Integrity

Unequal bargaining power relative to the production or
dissemination entity is the primary reason many artists give up their
moral rights. 20 5 Some classes of creative artists have strengthened
their bargaining position by forming guilds through which they
bargain with the production entities. One film and television industry
group that makes the acquisition of attribution and integrity rights its
mission is the Writer's Guild of America (WGA).20 6 Although screen
and television writers are generally seen as the lowest paid and least
acknowledged members of the entertainment industry family 20 7 - with
WGA members even working for several months under an expired
contract in 2004208 - the WGA's strategy for gaining attribution and
integrity rights is worth exploring.
It is extremely rare for WGA writers to own copyrights in their
work. Usually, they either sell their screenplays or teleplays or create
them as works for hire. 20 9 However, as a term for giving up the
204.
JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC, MONEY AND SUCCESS 353 (3d Ed.
Music Sales Corporation 2002).
205.
Lowe & Kholsa, supra note 11, at 40.
206.
See, e.g., WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL (2002)
available at http://www.wga.org/subpage-writersresources.aspx?id=168 [hereinafter WGA,
SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL]; see also WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, 2001 THEATRICAL AND

TELEVISION BASIC AGREEMENT xvi-xvii (2001) [hereinafter WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT]
(explaining the WGA's rationale for opposing possessive credits of directors) (on file with
the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law).
207.

DONALD E. BIEDERMAN, ET. AL.,

LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT

INDUSTRIES 633 (4th ed. 2001).
208.
See Dave McNary, WGA: No Resolution Soon, VARIETY, July 2, 2004, available
at http://www.variety.com/article/VRl 117907331?Categoryid=lO66&cs=l; Dave McNary,
Scribes Give The Contract the Thumbs Up VARIETY, Nov. 24, 2004, available at
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117913968?Categoryid=1066&cs=l
(noting that the
WGA agreed to its current contract on Nov. 23, 2004).
209.
WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, EAST & WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST,
CREATIVE RIGHTS FOR WRITERS OF THEATRICAL AND LONG FORM TELEVISION MOTION
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copyright by sale or work for hire, the WGA agreement includes
2 10
specific provisions protecting their credit and "creative rights."
Members are not allowed to waive these provisions or work for 1a1
2
production entity who is not a signatory to the basic agreement,
though all are allowed to negotiate more favorable terms than the
basic agreement provides. 21 2 The WGA is organized under the
National Labor Relations Act 213 and enforces its basic agreements
through member grievance procedures and binding arbitration, with
as the final authority, subject to
the National Labor Relations Board
214
judicial review in federal court.
In some cases, the WGA's Minimum Basic Agreement
mitigates a writer's transfer of copyright by giving back certain rights,
such as the right to publish the work in literary form or as a play or
the right to buy back the material after five years if the producer does
not make a film out of it.215 In the Minimum Basic Agreement and
WGA manuals, such rights are referred to as "separated rights."2 16 In
all cases, the Minimum Basic Agreement grants WGA members
certain rights calculated to protect the integrity of its member's work.
It breaks down these rights in a manual titled Creative Rights for
21 7
Writers of Theatricaland Long-Form Television Motion Pictures.
While the script is still in the development stage, those rights
include the right to perform the first rewrite after the writer's script is
acquired or optioned 218 and the right to perform the first revision after
21 9
there is a new element on the project, such as a new director or star.
Before production begins, and if a director has not been engaged, the
writer has a right to meet with the producer for a "meaningful

4 (2002), available at http://www.wgaeast.org/mba/creative rights.html
[hereinafter WGA, EAST & WGA, WEST]; see 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (designating the
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employer as the author and, absent an assignment to the contrary, the owner of a "work
made for hire").
WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 55.
210.
211.

WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, CODE OF WORKING RULES §§ 1, 2, 8 (1984),

available at http://www.wga.org/subpage.-writersresources.aspx?id=71.

212.

Id. § 6.

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160; see also WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, GUIDE TO
213.
THE GUILD 13, available at http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who we-are/fyiwhat.pdf.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

29 U.S.C. § 160.
WGA, EAST & WGA, WEST, supra note 209, at 5-6.

Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 8; see also WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 244.

WGA, EAST & WGA, WEST, supra note 209, at 9; see also WGA, BASIC
219.
AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 244.
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While

these rights do not completely protect the writer's right to integrity,
they are steps in that direction, and, like separated rights, help
mitigate the loss of the guarantees of a valid copyright.
Because attribution is so important to its members, the WGA
issues and updates a Screen Credits Manual and a Television Credits
Manual explaining the credit provisions in its 2001 Theatrical and
Television Basic Agreement.221 The preface to both manuals begins, "a

writer's position in the motion picture or television industry is
determined largely by his/her credits," and calls determining proper
credit "one of the most important services the Guild provides for its
members." 222 The preface further states that the Guild accomplishes
this goal through its Basic Agreements with employers and through
rules governing the conduct of its members. 223
Both manuals are organized into the same sections and subsections, and the rules for each medium differ only slightly. 224 The
Basic Agreement gives the WGA final authority on the writing credits
of all the films and television shows signatory companies produce. 225
Pursuant to this authority, and with itself as the arbitrator in all
disputes, the WGA outlines a series of rules governed by the following
belief, stated in both manuals: "fewer names and fewer types of credit
enhance the value of all credits and the dignity of all writers."226
The WGA uses a combination of approaches to achieve this
end. First, it has an elaborate notification scheme. 227 It requires
signatory companies to notify writers of any other writers who are
working or have worked on the same project and requires all writers
currently working on a project to notify each other. 228 For television
220.
WGA, EAST & WGA, WEST, supra note 209, at 11-12; see also WGA, BASIC
AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 349.
221.
See WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 469-523; WGA, SCREEN
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206; WGA, TELEVISION CREDITS MANUAL (Nov. 2002),
available at http://www.wga.org/subpage-writersresources.aspx?id=177 [hereinafter WGA,
TELEVISION CREDITS MANUAL].

222.

WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206.

223.

Id.

224.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206; WGA, TELEVISION CREDITS
MANUAL, supra note 221; compare WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 469-99,
with WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 500-20.
225.
WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 55.
226.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(B)(7); WGA, TELEVISION
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § III(B)(8).
227.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, §§ II-III; WGA, TELEVISION
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, §§ II-Ill.
228.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § I(A)(1); WGA, TELEVISION
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § I(A)(1).
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shows of 90 minutes or longer or by request in any film, writers must
also be notified of anyone hired after them to work on the same
material. 229 Signatories must send the WGA and all writers assigned
to work on a project a copy of the project's tentative credits, and the
credits to the WGA before the
writers have the right to contest those
230
release of the film or television show.
The WGA pursues its "fewer types of credit" agenda with a list
of acceptable credits for each medium, such as "written by,"2 3 ' "story
*..."234 Any type of
by,"232 "screenplay by,"233 and "screen story by .
writing credit not on the list may only be used with a specific waiver
from the WGA. 235 Some listed types,236such as "adaptation by," may
only be used as a result of arbitration.
The WGA pursues its "fewer names" agenda with specific limits
on the number of writers that can be credited in each category;
generally, no more than two. 237 An ampersand between two names
indicates a writing team, which is counted as one writer.23 8 However,
arbitration is required in order to list two writing teams (or three

229.

WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § I(A)(1); WGA, TELEVISION

CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § I(A)(1).

WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § II; WGA, TELEVISION
230.
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § II.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(A) (stating that "written
231.

by" is used when the writer is entitled to both the "Story by" credit and the "Screenplay by"
credit); see also WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 472.
232.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(A) ("Story by" is used
when a guild member contributes narrative material "distinct from [a] screenplay and
consisting of [a] basic narrative, idea, theme or outline indicating character development
and action." It applies to stories written under guild employment jurisdiction, stories
purchased from a professional writer and sequel stories written under guild jurisdiction.);
see also WGA, BASIC AGREEMENT, supra note 206, 469-72.
233.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III ("screenplay by" is used

when a writer has contributed individual scenes and full dialogue constituting a
substantial contribution to the final script and the writer entitled to "story by" credit is a
different writer or the screenplay was based on source material.); see also, WGA, BASIC
AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 469.
234.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(A) ("screen story by" is
used when the screenplay is based upon both source material and a story and the story is
substantially new or different from the source material).
235.

WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(B)(7); WGA, TELEVISION

CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § III(B)(8).
236.

WGA,

SCREEN

CREDITS

MANUAL,

supra note 206,

§

III(A)(10);

WGA,

TELEVISION CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § III(A)(15); see also WGA, BASIC
AGREEMENT, supra note 206, at 469.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(B); WGA, TELEVISION
237.
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § III(B).
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, §§ I(B), III(A)(1); WGA,
238.
TELEVISION CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, §§ I(B), III(A)(1).
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writers) in the "screenplay by" film credit category. 239 To get
"screenplay by" credit at all, a writer or team must write thirty-three
percent of an adapted screenplay or fifty percent of an original
screenplay. 240 If disputed, experienced WGA members assess such
percentages in arbitration, based on certain listed elements of a
screenplay. 241 Of course, both manuals recommend that writers keep
242
detailed track of all of the work they do.
By reducing the number of names and types of credit listed, the
WGA hopes to enhance two things: "the value of all credits and the
dignity all writers."243 While its rules may reduce the number of
writers hired or even force some writers to work without credit, 24 4 the
WGA believes unrestrained crediting would put writers in a far worse
predicament. 245 An examination of how the rules achieve their stated
purposes reveals that those purposes are aimed as much at the right
of integrity as attribution.
Fewer credits enhance the value of each. If producers are
allowed to invent new categories of credit or load existing credits with
the names of their friends, children, mistresses or bookies, (which,
according to Hollywood lore and WGA dogma, was common practice
before the WGA), 246 the writers who did the actual work have their
credit diluted. 247 This is a direct violation of the right to attribution.
However, the WGA rules are wary of having too many writers
actually working on a script. The notification requirements in Section
I of both manuals confront a "too many cooks" situation, in which
producers hire a succession of writers to rewrite one another's scripts,
without informing the original writer or telling the "script-doctor"
whose script he is changing. 248 The notification requirements coupled
239.

WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(A)(4).

240.

Id. § III(B)(4).

241.

Id.

242.

Id. § I(A)(3).

§

III(B)(4)(c).

243.
Id. § III(B)(7); WGA, TELEVISION CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § III(B)(8).
244.
Writers Guild of America, East, Credits Forum (2002) available at
http://wgaeast.org/features/credits-forum.html, [hereinafter WGA East, Credits Forum]
(section on "shared credit," second comment by J.F. Lawton); see also BIEDERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 207, at 633 (discussing the prevalence of secret rewrites).
245.
WGA East, Credits Forum, supra note 244 (section on "shared credit," second
comment by J.F. Lawton).
246.
Id. (section on "Production Executives," introductory paragraph).
247.
See id. (section on "Production Executives," first comment by Seth Freeman
stating, "writers are concerned about producers coming in after the fact, or at the last
minute, claiming credit for something when the writer going in had no idea that the
producer viewed himself as a writer, or had any intention to do that").
248.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § I(A)(1); WGA, TELEVISION
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § I(A)(1); see also WGA East, Credits Forum, supra note
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with the credit limits have a chilling effect on multiple rewrites: any
writer hired to do a second rewrite would know she may not get credit
for it, 249 especially in light of the WGA's presumptions in favor of the
first writer. 250 By chilling multiple rewrites, the WGA can ensure its
writers' scripts stay more intact, strengthening their right of
integrity. 251 Protecting against a culture where writers can have their
work mutilated without notification is likely what the WGA means by
enhancing "the dignity of [the] writer[ ."252
Of course, the WGA credits system is not a perfect safeguard of
the rights of attribution and integrity. 253 In a recent forum of WGA
254
members and officers, some opined that the rules were ineffective,
and even counter-productive. 255 One writer at the forum pointed out
that the percentage requirements for "screenplay by" credit create an
incentive for a second writer to change more of the script than
necessary to qualify for credit. 25 6 Producers still hire "script-doctors"
to change scripts, some of whom work anonymously, and credit for
These purported
screenwriters is by no means guaranteed. 25 7
problems are by no means insubstantial, but the fact that the WGA
has final say over credits means its members can fine-tune the rules
themselves through their representatives. The ability to determine
244 (section on "Shared Credit," with Stephen Schiff commenting, "there was one case that

supposedly had 12 v::riters - the idea of having all of them listed, nestled in a tiny credit
block next to the director's name is tough to contemplate").
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III; WGA, TELEVISION
249.
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § III.
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § I(C); WGA, TELEVISION
250.
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § I(C).; see also WGA East, Credits Forum, supra note
223, at section on 'Vriter Protections/Standards for Determining Credit" (WGA member
and officer acknowledging the WGA's "first writer bias").
WGA East, Credits Forum, supra note 244 (third comment by J.F. Lawton
251.
stating: "The problem with films that have numerous participating writers is not that we
don't allow enough credits. The problem is that the studio felt that they needed ten or more
different writers to write it.").
WGA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 206, § III(B)7; WGA, TELEVISION
252.
CREDITS MANUAL, supra note 221, § III(B)8; see also, WGA East, Credits Forum, supra
note 244 (third comment by J.F. Lawton stating: "The more you change, the better your
chances of winning").
WGA East, Credits Forum, supra note 244 (section on "shared credit," first
253.
comment by J.F. Lawton).
254.
WGA East, Credits Forum, supra note 244 (section on "shared credit," first
comment by Nicholas Kazan).
255.
WGA East, Credits Forum, supra note 244 (section on "shared credit," third
comment by J.F. Lawton stating: "The studios play us for suckers because they designed a
whole bonus system all based on this credits lottery mentality that pits writer against
writer.").
256.
Id.
BIEDERMAN, supra note 207, at 633 (discussing the prevalence of secret
257.
rewrites).
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how they will be credited and to set limits on the number of rewrites
done on their work represents a huge moral rights gain for WGA
writers.
IV.PUTTING

VARA IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE

As noted above, VARA protects the rights of attribution and
integrity for creators of a narrow class of visual arts. 258
Such
protections are independent of the other rights listed in the Copyright
Act and last for the life of the author. 259 The plaintiffs in Dastarwere
not eligible for VARA's protections and the lapse of the copyright made
them ineligible for the protections listed in section 106 of the
Copyright Act, which were explored in the previous section. 260 While
some commentators have advocated the extension of VARA's
protections to all types of copyrightable expression, 261 they have not
yet been successful. However, this does not mean that Congress
foreclosed all moral rights protections for expression outside of VARA,
nor does it mean that the protections explored above render VARA
superfluous. 26 2 As seen in the congressional record, VARA was
intended to be narrow and have no effect, positive or negative, on the
263
ability of artists outside its scope to protect their moral rights.
In a speech in support of VARA, Congressman Carlos J.
Moorhead of California told the U.S. House of Representatives that his
support of the act was "predicated, in large part, on the fact that it is
so narrowly drawn."264 He stated that the act protected the prescribed
class of artists "without interfering, directly or indirectly, with the
ability of U.S. copyright owners and users to further the constitutional
goal of ensuring public access to a broad, diverse array of creative
works." 265 The "constitutional purpose" to which he referred was the
Article 1, Section 8 provision for Congress to encourage authors by
266
giving them a monopoly for "limited times ....

258.

See 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (2000).

259.

Id. § 106A(a).

260.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2003).
261.
Lowe & Kholsa, supra note 11, 44; Crabbs, supra note 11.
262.
See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35 (Justice Scalia stated that extending moral rights
protections to works with expired copyrights would render VARA superfluous. If the right
to attribution can be tied to the exclusive rights in 106 and not just to "origin" in the
Lanham Act, it does not touch VARA; nor does VARA touch it.).
263.
136 Cong. Rec. E3716-03 (1990) (Statement of Rep. Moorhead).

264.
265.

Id.
Id.

266.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Congress was concerned that a broad statute would create
26 7
perpetual copyright protections, which would be unconstitutional,
but Congressman Moorhead was just as concerned with protecting the
rights of production entities to whom artists had transferred their
copyrights.
His speech mentioned U.S. preeminence in the
exportation of copyrighted material and the importance of
maintaining it by protecting the "the capacity of U.S. copyright
industries to produce, alter and disseminate their works." 268 Finally,
he assured his colleagues that there was no breach of "the broad wall
that we have erected against the legislation spilling over and affecting
the producers of books, magazines, motion pictures and other creative
work."

269

While the "broad wall" Congressman Moorhead mentioned is
intended to keep VARA's protections from seeping into the rest of the
Copyright Act, it must also keep Gilliam and its ilk safe. The text of
VARA itself proclaims that the rights it grants are "independent of the
270
exclusive rights provided in section 106" of the Copyright Act.
When read in light of Congressman Moorhead's remarks, this passage
clearly means that the section 106 rights are also independent of
VARA. Thus, no argument exists that VARA closes the door on moral
rights protections that already existed for subject matter outside its
scope.
V. CONCLUSION

While U.S. statutes and courts do not officially recognize moral
rights, 2 71 they do provide artists with some means of protecting them.
While Dastar may have rendered those means inadequate in a few
situations, 272 it still left most of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act open
to artists seeking attribution and integrity.2 7 3 In a majority of
situations, artists outside the scope of VARA can protect their moral

267.
See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33-34 ("[W]e have been careful to caution against
misuse or over-extension.").
268.
136 Cong. Rec. E3716-03 (1990) (Statement of Rep. Moorhead).
269.
Id.
270.
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
271.
See Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1948) (determining that composers of works in the public domain could not sue to
get them removed from a film because the U.S. does not recognize a cause of action arising
out of moral rights).
272.
See Lamothe v. Atl. Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Dastareffectively blocked joint authors, like the plaintiffs in this case, from using the
Lanham Act to sue for credit).
273.
See 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1).

364 VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 8:2:335

rights through the bundle of rights given them in the copyright act, 274
and by insisting on moral rights protections as a term of the contract
granting any of those rights to another party. When an unequal
bargaining position with a production or publication entity makes
such insistence impossible, artists can form guilds or unions and
bargain collectively for moral rights. In short, Dastar was by no
means a boon to artists' rights, but it was not a total bust either.

274.

17 U.S.C. § 106.

